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MARINE CORPS FIST: AN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 







The focus of the U.S. Marine Corps is the maneuver element, most importantly 
the infantry.  The artillery exists to support the maneuver element as the all-weather, all-
capable fire supporter.  The basic organization and strategy for Marine artillery has 
remained the same for over fifty years.  The objective of this project is to analyze the 
interaction of Marine Corps Artillery and Maneuver units to determine the congruence of 
the inter-organizational linkages to the stated strategy and operational need.  The Fire 
Support Team (FiST) is the team used to coordinate fire support at the lowest tactical 
level.  It consists of members from all of the fire support assets available to the maneuver 
company as well as members of the company command element.  Research has been 
conducted to determine the evaluation of the FiST by various stakeholders and the 
suggestions they have for improvement.  Organizational business literature is applied to 
the FiST concept in order to frame the analysis and give guidance for improvement.  
Using organizational analysis, recommendations will be provided to improve the 
customer/service (infantry/artillery) relationship.  These models will provide some 
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The United States Marine Corps Fire Support Team (FiST) is the maneuver 
company level integration tool for fire support coordination at the lowest tactical level.  
Over the course of the last fifty or so years, it has developed in to a very effective method 
for providing artillery, naval surface, and mortar fires, and close air support to the 
company commander.  As the past commandant’s guidance has spelled out, methods for 
improving fire support are a priority.  This study examines the FiST from a business 
organization point of view and attempts to optimize the team’s structure and operations. 
 
Methodology 
In this project, the basic organizational structure and an explanation of the role of the 
FiST was provided.  Organizational and, more specifically, interorganizational literature 
was researched in order to gain a perspective on the research and models used for 
improving business coordination.  Additionally, Marines, termed stakeholders, who have 
served with or who have experience with the FiST, were surveyed to determine the 
evaluations and concerns those operators have with the concept.   These included 
artillery, infantry, armor, air, and logistics Marines. 
 
Findings and Conclusions 
Research revealed the following: 
• The FiST concept grew out of the need for the company commander to have 
control of the fire support assets at his disposal.  It is the best organizational 
device to achieve the required degree of coordination from the various assets. 
• In business concepts, teams have to be given a priority of stability, continuity, and 
decision-making power in order to operate at optimal rates. 
• The artillery community has a history of fluctuating priorities in how it staffs the 
Forward Observer (FO) Teams.  This has had a detrimental effect on the 
maneuver/artillery relationship. 
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• The artillery community has a developed a culture of provincialism and goal 




This project recommends the following measures to optimize the FiST: 
• Take the FO Team and liaison section from the artillery battery and make it 
organic to the maneuver battalion. 
• The enlisted personnel in these sections would permanently move to the Table of 
Organization of the maneuver unit. 
• Create a one-year block in the artillery officer’s three-year initial operational tour 
in which he fills these FO and/or liaison officer billets. 
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I. BASIC INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The Marine Corps Division is the command organization for the main ground 
combat force of the United States Marine Corps.  The coordination of its fire support 
assets and those provided by the Marine Air Wing through close air support is an ongoing 
topic of discussion throughout the Marine Corps.  Maneuver units, such as infantry, 
tanks, and Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) units rely on fire support, both organic 
and non-organic, to augment their direct fire capabilities.  Artillery units are the primary 
providers of fire support and are responsible for providing the coordination for using 
fires.  The focus of artillery in general is to provide and integrate efficient and effective 
fire support.  This study analyzes the employment and organization of the Forward 
Observer (FO) team as a part of the inter-organizational link between the fire support 
assets and the maneuver units at the lowest level of the tactical chain of command for fire 
support coordination. Using organizational analysis, recommendations are provided to 
improve the customer/service (infantry/artillery) relationship.  The project provides an 
analysis of the organizations involved in the fire support process and the relations among 
them. The final result includes a recommendation for optimizing the inter-organizational 
link, the Fire Support Team (FiST).   
B. QUESTIONS 
1.  How does the Marine Corps Division coordinate its fire support efforts among 
the various elements? 
 In addressing this question, the project focuses down to the tactical, company 
level.  It looks at the use of the FiST in practice and application.  The basic structure and 
work that the FiST does is examined.  Interviews and articles from publications were 
obtained and summarized to give the best description of the actual status of the FiST. 
 2.  Does the FiST provide the optimal level of coordination? 
 Many models and guides exist describing the most effective ways to organize and 
operate the interaction between organizations.  Studies from Galbraith (1977) and the 
organizational models of Daft (2001) provide insight into the business solutions for 
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optimizing inter-organizational relationships and creating environments for efficient 
interaction.  The project uses this guidance to measure the effectiveness of the FiST as a 
coordination vehicle and as a force multiplier. 
 3.  How can the United States Marine Corps optimize its fire support organization 
at the FiST level to provide the best solution for the maneuver’s needs? 
 By combining the academic and business models with the stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the requirements of the FiST, alternative solutions are available to improve 
the concept.  The benefits and negatives of each solution are presented as well as a 
conclusion for the optimal answer. 
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
Initially, relevant organizations are identified and described to provide the 
necessary background, i.e., the problem is set up.  Next, the FiST is explained as well as 
the processes needed to coordinate and conduct fire support.  The next chapter presents 
academic literary research concerning the study of organizations and inter-organizational 
relationships.  The research attempts to offer guidance for improvement by dealing with 
the fire support system as a customer/service provider relationship.  It also provides some 
insight into the role of an integrating team and ways to enhance its performance.  After 
the organizations are described, relevant stakeholders are identified.  Additionally, some 
members of the stakeholder categories have been surveyed and their responses, as well as 
other evidence, about the state of the FiST are presented.  The purpose of this is to 
provide descriptions of the positives, negatives, and possible improvements that can be 
made in the FiST as an inter-organizational link.  Finally, the project incorporates the 
stakeholders’ views of the FiST into the academic, business-oriented research.  A 
conclusion of the present situation of the FiST is reached followed by recommendations 
for optimization.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
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The research for this project was divided into two categories.  First, the academic 
portion of finding and applying business models to this topic consisted of researching 
texts applicable to inter-organizational relationships relative to the conditions of fire 
support in the Marine Corps.  Multiple resources explained the relationships from a 
business perspective and suggestions from some of these are used during the evaluation. 
First hand experience and background with the fire support system provided much 
of the impetus for examining this aspect of the Marine Corps.  Professional texts and 
publications were consulted both for fundamental explanations of the FiST concept and 
also for the editorial opinions found in such periodicals as the Marine Corps Gazette. 
Finally, a non-scientific set of interviews and an e-mail questionnaire were used 
to determine the perceptions and suggestions of the stakeholders in the study.  
Infantrymen, tankers, LAV Marines, artillerymen, pilots, and manpower types were 
solicited to provide input about impressions, effects of change, and anecdotal evidence of 
their perception of the status, utility, and experience with the FiST fire support 
relationship.  This suggestive research has been consolidated to provide generalizations 
of the perspectives of the stakeholder groups and to create a general picture each group’s 
concerns, including their standards for success.  Many interviewees provided input for 
aspects that need improvement and even solutions for the improvement.  Interestingly, 
some suggestions were parallel to the models that the academic works described and give 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. MISSION  
A Marine division executes amphibious assault operations and 
such other operations as may be directed.  The Marine division provides 
ground amphibious forcible entry capability to the naval expeditionary 
force (NEF) and conducts subsequent land operations in any operational 
environment. The division commander fights using combined arms tactics 
and tailors the force to the demands of each mission.  (MAGTF Officer’s 
FMF/MAGTF Organization Handbook, p.C-11) 
 
B. ORGANIZATION 
A brief description of the Marine division and its significant parts is provided.  
The Marine division is to conduct amphibious assault operations and other missions such 
as military operations other than war (MOOTW), sustained combat operations, and 
forcible entry for follow on forces.  The division has two important characteristics: 
combined arms employment and the ability to organize the force for specific 
requirements of the given mission.  Essentially, this project focuses on two main aspects 
of the division: maneuver (which includes infantry, tanks, and light armored 





Figure 1, Infantryman (From HQMC) 
 “The primary mission of the infantry is to locate, close with, and destroy 
the enemy by fire and maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat.” 
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(MAGTF, p. C-18)  The infantry Marine is the primary, often singular focus of the 
combat effort.  Every supporting arm and organization exists to allow him to close with 
and destroy the enemy.  Survival on the battlefield and the ability to maintain the 
initiative necessitate that the infantry units remain as lightly equipped and mobile as 
possible.  The light infantry concept dictates that heavy machine guns, 81mm mortars 
and, anti-tank missiles will be the heaviest support weapons available organically to the 
infantry regiment.  The other supporting arms will provide heavier support as needed. 
b. Tanks 
 
Figure 2, M1A1  (From HQMC) 
“The tank battalion provides combat power to the division in the 
amphibious assault and subsequent operations ashore using fire and maneuver, mobility, 
armor-protected fire power, and shock action to close with and destroy the enemy.” 
(MAGTF, p. C-26)  Tank units are often cross attached with infantry units to form 
mechanized task forces.  This allows the commander to combine the capabilities of the 
infantry with that of the tanks to create a combined arms force in each unit.  Tanks are 
used to conduct operations where their armor and speed are necessary such as breaching 







c. Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) 
 
Figure 3, LAV (From HQMC) 
 “The mission of the light armored reconnaissance battalion is to locate, 
close with, and destroy enemy forces by fire and maneuver exploiting high mobility, 
agility and firepower, and conduct reconnaissance, security, and economy of force 
missions.” (MAGTF, p. C-39)  LAR serves as the modern version of Civil War-era 
cavalry for the Marine division.  It is a highly mobile, lightly armored force that provides 
combat power and the ability to push ahead of the division’s main effort to help shape the 
imminent battles.  LAR units fight as mounted units until it is necessary to dismount the 













2. Fire Support Units 
a. Artillery 
Figure 4,  M198 Howitzer (From HQMC)  
“The mission of the field artillery is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the 
enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire and to assist in integrating all fire support into 
combined arms operations.”  (FM 6-20, p3-21)  More specifically, “the mission of 
Marine artillery is to provide close and continuous fire support by neutralizing or 
destroying targets that threaten the success of the supported unit.”  (FM 6-20, p3-45)  The 
main ideas to be extracted from the mission statements are support of maneuver through 
artillery fires and integration of all other fires into the operational plan.  The battalions 
are composed of three firing batteries of six 155mm howitzers apiece.  The artillery is to 








b. Close Air Support 
 
Figure 5, AH-1 Cobra (From HQMC) 
The Marine air wing is composed of the aircraft used by the Marine Corps 
to support the maneuver elements.  It consists of transports, intelligence and electronic 
warfare aircraft, and refueling craft.  In addition, the air wing applies directly to this 
project in the provision of close air support, which is fire support applied to enemy units 
engaged within such a proximity of the maneuver that efficient coordination is required.  
This includes fixed wing and rotary wing assets delivering guided and unguided 
munitions and automatic gunfire.  When delivering close air support, the aircraft are in 









Figure 6, 80mm & 60mm Mortars (From HQMC) 
Mortars “(d)eliver fires to support maneuver, especially against 
dismounted infantry” and “fire smoke missions, mark targets, and provide battlefield 
illumination.”  (MAGTF Offense Course Volume II, p.8B-45) 
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Mortars are the most responsive asset in the infantry company.  The 
company has a complement of 60mm mortars organic to the weapons platoon.  These are 
for direct support for the company and have limited range and casualty effects.  The 
battalion owns a complement of 81mm mortars that are an upgrade in both range and 
destructive effects than the 60mm mortar.  These fires are delegated according to the 
priority of companies as the main effort and as the situation dictates.  They are 
exceptional in providing smoke munition marks for aircraft performing close air support 
(CAS). 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES 
1. USMC Fires 
The artillery is a supporting arm of the combined arms operations practiced by the 
Marine Corps.  The basic premise of combined arms is to use all combat power in 
coordination, providing the adversary with no options for avoiding the effects, for the 
purpose of closing with and destroying the enemy by fire and maneuver.  These assets 
include: 
• indirect Naval surface fires from offshore 
• supporting Army rocket fires 
• Close Air Support (CAS) from Marine and other service aircraft  
• field artillery fires 
• direct fire support from armored vehicles (tanks), amphibious armored 
vehicles (AAVs), and light armored vehicles (LAVs) 
• organic fires from heavy machine guns and mortars 
• rifleman’s M16A2 
In order for these elements of the Marine combat force to combine into an 
orchestrated, singular effort, the element on the ground (the maneuver company) must 
have the necessary means to use the available tools in the most effective way possible.  
From here on, infantry, tank, and LAV elements will be aggregately referred to as 
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maneuver units (companies or battalions).  The organization tool used in an attempt to 
achieve this has been the Fire Support Team (FiST). 
2. General Fire Support Organization and Relationships 
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(3 per Division) 
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Artillery Battery 
(3 per Battalion) 
FSC 
Figure 7, Fire Support Linkages 
In order to better explain the dynamics of the FiST, it is necessary to explain the 
fire support organization through the Marine division.  Within the Marine division are 
three infantry regiments, one tank battalion, one LAV battalion, and one artillery 
regiment among other supporting units.  The artillery regiment is divided into four firing 
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battalions and one headquarters battery.  Three of the artillery battalions are designated 
for direct supports roles to specified infantry regiments.  These units often form 
relationships to provide some continuity of interaction and operations.  The fourth 
artillery battalion is a general support battalion.  The artillery regiment provides fire 
support coordination elements to the division.  This is in the form of the regimental 
commander serving as the chief liaison officer to the division with a substantial staff of 
coordinating officers (0802 MOS designators), enlisted artillery fire supporters (0861 
MOS designators), and radio operators.  The staff group is called a fire support 
coordination section and establishes and operates a fire support coordination center 
(FSCC) at the division headquarters. 
 
Figure 8, Artillery Organization, (From MCWP 3-16.1, p. 2-1) 
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The direct support artillery battalions provide their designated infantry regiment 
with a similar organizational element that comes from the battalion’s headquarters 
battery.  The purpose of these sections are to assist in planning the fire support for the 
maneuver element, orchestrate the employment of the various fire support elements, and 
advise the maneuver commander in his use of the assets provided during operational, 
“field” environments.  In garrison, these sections are to lead the training of the rest of the 
regiment in the employment of fire support down to the lowest enlisted levels and serve 
as a communication vehicle between the artillery battalions and the infantry regiments.  
The general support battalions possess the same FSCC elements and these are often 
allotted to the tank or LAV battalions during training and operations.  However, there is 
rarely any interaction in the garrison environment. 
Moving down the organizational ladder, the three firing batteries within the 
artillery battalion each possess a liaison section for attaching to an infantry battalion.   
 
Figure 9, Battery Organization, (From MCWP 3-16.1, p. 6-2) 
 
Under the table of organization, the liaison element consists of a senior First 
Lieutenant, the senior 0861 Scout/Observer, another 0861, and several communicators.  
This group forms the artillery element within the maneuver battalion FSCC.  In addition, 
the liaison officer will sometimes serve as the Fire Support Coordinator (FSC) for the 
battalion.  
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Also coming from the battery are three Forward Observer (FO) teams consisting 
of one lieutenant, an 0861 scout/observer, and two communicators.  Each of these teams 
is attached to one of the rifle companies, where the lieutenant forward observer serves as 
the artillery member of the FiST.  The FiST consists of the artillery FO, a pilot serving as 
a forward air controller (FAC), a mortars observer, and the FiST leader, usually the 
company executive officer (XO).  It is here that the lowest level of fire support 
coordination is conducted. 
3. The FiST Components- 
a. Company Commander 
 According to MCWP 3-16, “The company commander is responsible for 
coordination of his fires and organizes his personnel accordingly.”  The demands of 
conducting maneuver operations with three rifle platoons, a weapons platoon, and a 
headquarters section create a large enough burden that the company commander has 
customarily assigned managing fire supports coordination to the executive officer (XO).  
Depending on the situation, the commander may have all assets of a FiST attached to his 
company or just one or two, if some assets are not available.  Personnel within the 
company must be proficient enough to use these assets competently even if the liaison-
type personnel are not provided. 
b. Executive Officer 
In addition to being the second in command, the XO is often tasked with 
being the FiST leader.  This involves applying the company commander’s intent for fires 
in support of his scheme of maneuver.  As a First Lieutenant, he must be aware of each 
asset’s potential and capabilities and be capable of leading a group of relatively disparate 
individuals.  As the team becomes more accustomed to working together, the XO’s role 
can transform from a leadership role to more of a commodity manager, coordinating 
much like an orchestra conductor. 
c. Forward Air Controller (FAC) 
This individual is usually a Captain who has at least one flying tour and 
has completed extensive training in using the capabilities of close air support.  He serves 
a designated FAC tour with the maneuver battalion for at least a year and is considered 
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organic to the battalion.  The FAC’s ability to communicate effectively with the 
supporting aircraft and affect their accurate delivery of munitions is his greatest asset.  In 
infantry and LAV units, he will be accompanied by a radio operator to assist with the 
communications equipment, but tanks do not have enough room and he will usually 
function as the XO’s loader and operate his own radio. 
d. Mortars Observer 
Usually a non-commissioned officer from the battalion, he may also be a 
Marine trained from within the company.  He is tasked with spotting, adjusting, and using 
the effects of the mortars at the guidance of the XO.  The mortars are usually the most 
responsive, but this is sometimes offset by a comparative lack of lethality, accuracy, and 
range.  The mortars observer can often be best used to provide marks for the close 
support aircraft and to plan for quickly fired targets that are within the company’s zone of 
action. 
e. Artillery Forward Observer (FO) 
Usually, one team is provided to each rifle company with a composition of 
the following: 
Table 1, Forward Observer Team (From MCWP 3-6.6, p.1-1,2) 
 
1101. Responsibilities. The primary responsibility of the FO is to 
plan and coordinate supporting fires at the company level. The FO 
team locates targets, calls for and adjusts fire, and reports the 
results of fire. In combat or emergency situations when there is no 





The FO team is a part of the liaison section that is attached to the 
maneuver battalion prior to field training evolutions or deployments.  While habitual 
relationships exist formally, they are seldom practiced in garrison environments and in 
reality serve as a loose guide for attachment during operations only.  The fire support 
man will be either attached to the main effort platoon to provide increased responsiveness 
to the unit or be located with the FiST to assist with observing and adjusting fires.  In 
tank companies, the FO will be the only artillery representative present due to the lack of 
room in the vehicle.  The FO will serve as the company commander’s loader and operate 
his own communications.  The enlisted fire support man can be used in the tank 
battalion’s scout and TOW missile platoons as they would if attached to single rifle 
platoons.   
3. Origin of the FiST 
The FiST as it is used in the Marines Corps developed as a result of the increased 
communications ability of supporting arms such as artillery, close air support, and 
mortars.  As the range of indirect fires and the speed of aircraft increased, a mechanism 
was required to coordinate these assets at the user level.  The creation of the FiST in use 
today traces back to the Vietnam War in which all sorts of fire supports assets were 
available to the Marines at the company level.  Because of the close proximity of 
engagements and frequent inability for higher commands to determine distinct lines 
between friendly and enemy units, the power to use the fire support at hand had to be 
exercised at the lowest levels of command.  Forward air controllers (FACs), mortar 
observers, and artillery forward observers (FOs) had existed in the companies in earlier 
conflicts, but Vietnam was the first conflict in which it became standard to staff these 
units with such personnel on a customary basis.   
4. Operations in the FiST 
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At the company level, all assets of the fires available will be used in concert with 
maneuver or defensive schemes to achieve victory.  The company commander will 
convey his intent for the fires and what effects he requires in conjunction with the higher 
plan of engagement.  The FiST leader manages the planning of the fires with the input 
and advice of the other members.  Mortars will be used against more thin-skinned targets 
mainly for suppression due to their relatively smaller destruction effects and high rate of 
fire.  The mortars are the most responsive asset available to the team, as they are organic 
to the unit and often within close proximity.  The FAC will have direct contact with the 
air controllers who manage the dispatching of aircraft.  Once on station, the FAC will talk 
directly to the aircraft, whether fixed or rotary wing, to thoroughly explain the situation 
and desired outcomes.  The artillery FO will be in direct contact with the supporting 
artillery unit’s fire direction center (FDC) whether regimental, battalion, or even battery.  
Often the mortars and artillery will suppress enemy air defense assets and other threats to 
the aircraft, in order for the air support to engage the enemy most effectively with its 
ordinance.  During offensive operations, the artillery and mortars will continue to fire 
into the enemy until friendly elements are within the effective casualty radius of the 
rounds.  This is often coordinated through very precise timing and mistakes will cause 
casualties.  Stopping the fires too early will allow the enemy to orient itself and engage 
the maneuvering elements before it is acceptable and letting fires go too long will result 
in fratricide.   
5. The Fire Mission 
 
Figure 10, The Fire Mission (From FM 6-30, p.1-1) 
The basic process of the fire mission is often one of the most difficult aspects of 
fire support.  For a target generated from the FiST level, the first event is gaining and 
maintaining communication with the artillery.  In order to simplify the explanation, the 
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scenario explained will be with one artillery battalion supporting an infantry regiment.  
With communication effective, the forward observer will make the call for fire to the 
battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC).  The infantry battalion and regimental FSCCs will 
be monitoring these messages and processing them for clearance of requisite priority 
targets, avoidance of friendly forces, and situational awareness of fires in the unit’s zone 
of action.  If any of these are violated, the FSCC will indicate to the FO and the FDC that 
the fires are not cleared by higher.  If this happens, further communication will be 
necessary to resolve the request for fires.  Otherwise, the battalion FDC will process the 
fire mission, determining the ordinance to use, any further coordination or clearances, 
and which battery(ies) will be designated to fire the mission.  This aspect is termed 
tactical fire direction. The batteries will then receive the mission where the battery FDC 
will determine the firing data by relating the target location to their firing pieces and 
translate the data for use by requisite pieces.  It will be conveyed to the howitzers, where 
it is applied and rounds are sent down range.  The FO applies adjustments and changes 
and the process is repeated until the desired effects are met. 
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III.  SUGGESTIONS FROM LITERATURE 
 The focus of this project is to analyze the fire support organization at the Fire 
Support Team (FiST) level and then apply business inter-organizational studies to 
determine how to better understand the interaction between the organizations and 
specifically, the members of the FiST.  This project analyzes the organizations involved 
in the combined arms combat team of the Marine division.  The FiST is inherently the 
inter-organizational link at the lowest level for this collaboration.  The following chapter 
describes the general means for information dissemination and coordination.  It then 
addresses lateral relations according to business management literature.  Next, the FiST is 
fit into the academic framework and explained as a mechanism of lateral relations.  
Finally, observations from academic literature are provided to give the FiST a means to 
optimize the team development. 
 A. GENERAL MEANS OF COORDINATION 
This project uses Professor Jay R. Galbraith’s Organization Design (1977) as the 
primary tool for analyzing the inter-organizational relationship that is manifested in the 
FiST.  The book describes the process and considerations for designing organizations for 
coordination and various aspects that can be used for improvement or as catalysts for 
change.  The book goes through the process of how to design an organization, along with 
the basic and alternative options for designs.  At this point, he determines that the task 
uncertainty is the variable that dictates the organizational design (Galbraith 1977, 35) 
Considerations of information flow, characterized by supply and demand or current and 
desired efficiency terms, is an evaluative tool to help gauge the uncertainty.  (Galbraith 
1977, 37)  Additionally, the level of decision-making must be closely scrutinized.  
(Galbraith 1977, 42)  The level that has the best awareness of information about the task 
environment, possesses an adequate sense of direction and mission intent, and can use the 
tools available is the one where decisions should be made. 
Often the first options available for organizational improvement is changing the 
hierarchy of command, rules or procedures for operations, or even increasing the ability 
of lower echelons to make decisions. (Galbraith 1977, 42-48)  The hierarchy of authority 
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is the arrangement of managerial, leadership, decision-making, and coordination roles.  
The structure is very familiar to members of the military and any other organization 
where a chain of command is operative.  Changes to the hierarchy, especially in a well 
established organization, are very difficult to achieve and are often vigorously opposed.  
The need to coordinate through the hierarchical channels is often limiting and inefficient.  
Organizations are often forced to adapt with other mechanisms to achieve coordination. 
Rules and standard procedures for operations are used to make communication 
and planning unnecessary when the operations are conducted in an anticipated 
environment.  These are used to make decision-making decentralized and actions second 
nature to the lower levels in the hierarchy.  The purpose is to create repetitive reactions to 
situations.  These rules are an augmenting extension of the hierarchy.  The standard 
procedures can aid decentralization to the lower levels but are still susceptible to an 
uncertain environment. 
As the environmental uncertainty grows, the upper echelon will often enhance the 
decision-making ability of the lower levels through increased training and professional 
staffing.  This does enhance the effectiveness of almost any organization although it can 
dramatically affect the control from the higher levels.  Other facets of this aspect include 
setting goals and commander’s guidance.  These directions can provide the professional 
operator with enough guidance to accomplish a task even when the variables may be 
erratic.   
The next step in creating more efficient coordination is attempting to manage and 
tailor the environment to better suit the hierarchy and mission of the organization.  Some 
of these actions include influencing competitors and customers to conduct business in 
manner more suitable to the organization.  Also, attempting to operate in more hospitable 
or conducive environment is a response that faltering or struggling organizations attempt. 
The creation of slack resources, which means reducing the level of productivity, is 
an often unacceptable response to task uncertainty.  However, this is exactly what 
happens if an organization avoids making changes to deal with uncertainty. (Galbraith 
1977, 55)  When the hierarchy and coordination processes are stressed to the point of 
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overload, they have the option of neglecting some of the demands.  This type of response, 
or lack thereof, is not an option when considering coordination optimization unless the 
costs of the other options are greater than loss of productivity. 
Third, creation of self-contained tasks is an option that allows the information 
processing to center around a functional task.  This creates a division within the 
organization that can perform all of the functions necessary to accomplish a specific 
mission.  A Marine Expeditionary Unit is a type of self-contained task oriented 
coordinating mechanism that is a conglomeration of all types of Marine units.  It is self 
supporting (at least for a limited period) and focused on small-scale littoral operations.  
Here, the decision making process is moved down further to the source of information, 
which allows for less extensive coordination.  This is a very potent coordination and 
organizing mechanism.  All of the means for production, mission accomplishment, and 
administration are owned within the self-contained organization.    
Fourth, investment in vertical information systems is an area where the Marine 
Corps has made considerable progress.  “The investment strategy is to collect information 
at the points of origination and direct it to the appropriate places in the hierarchy.” 
(Galbraith 1977, 52)  The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and 
other methods of disseminating information up and down the organizational chain of 
command have given the Marine Corps an advantage in the constantly changing combat 
environment.  Planning changes and situation reports can be transmitted and understood 
at the lowest tactical levels including the FiST.  The vertical transmission of information 
is a boon to the maneuver units but it does not solve the requirement for on the spot 
situational awareness and weaponeering coordination at the company level.  The solution 
for this is the FiST or what Galbraith generally terms “creation of lateral relations.” 
(Galbraith 1977, 52)   
B. LATERAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The lateral relationships perform two main functions: breaking down authority 
barriers and pushing the decision making down to the lowest level where the information 
is first encountered.  This decentralizes the decision-making and allows the decision 
making process to be organized according to the expected uncertainty of the situations 
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that will be encountered. (Galbraith 1977, 53)  The “point of information origin” 
(Galbraith 1977, 111) is often the same point where the decisions can be made most 
effectively, as is the case of the FiST in contact with the enemy or determining which 
training options to focus on. 
Interestingly, the FiST is not a doctrinal term that can be found in Marine Corps 
publications.  Its development initially followed the “informal organization” that 
Galbraith describes as arising spontaneously in response to a change in the operating 
environment.  The FiST’s development as it operates now is well documented in Robert 
Scales’ Firepower in Limited War (1990).  While the custom of the FiST has evolved to 
the point where it is taken for granted as standard operating procedure, its lack of 
formalization has created an environment where changes may be made relatively easy 
and without greatly affecting warfighting doctrine.  The lack of formalization has also 
lead to the situation described in Scales’ book where billet changes are made on the fly in 
order to temporarily fix a less than optimal situation.   
The first step in creating lateral relations is direct contact between two 
representatives to solve a problem. (Galbraith 1977, 53)  This measure takes the decision-
making away from higher levels but is often informal and short-lived.  One version of 
direct contact is lateral transfer, which is actually transferring an individual from one 
department or organization to another.  That individual serves in a duty inherent to the 
receiving organization.  An example would be for an artillery or supply officer to be 
transferred to an infantry unit to serve as platoon commander.  The hope would be that 
the time spent in the unit would enhance the lateral relations between the involved units. 
(Galbraith 1977, 114)  This type of transfer occurs in a very limited basis among 
American military services, i.e. Army officers serving in Marine organization billets, and 
also with foreign services, such as American officers exchanging with British ones and 
actually filling operational jobs.  The lateral process method is more developed in the fire 
support role. 
The development is using a liaison role to imbed a representative from one 
organization in another specifically to augment the communication between the groups.  
As long as these individuals operate outside of a group designed for the integration of 
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information, they fall within the designation of the liaison role.  This was the role filled 
by forward observers in units before close air support came along to complement the fire 
support system.   
The two tools described above work well when communication is necessary 
between just two entities.  When multiple parties are necessary for information 
processing and decision-making, groups of representatives are often the best way to reach 
a decision. (Galbraith 1977, 116)  The simplest form of this is the task force.  It is a 
conglomeration of representatives of the involved organizations who gather temporarily 
to solve a significant issue.  When the issue is resolved, the task force dissolves.  It could 
be argued that the FiST often falls into this category as it is often constituted just prior to 
field operations and as soon as these are finished so is the FiST. 
(T)he next response is to use group problem solving on a more permanent 
basis.  Teams are typically formed around frequently occurring problems.  
(Galbraith 1977, 116)  
 Teams may occur at all levels along the hierarchy and can be tailored according 
to the decisions to be made and the stakeholders involved.  Teams are best described as at 
least semi-permanent, co-located within physical contact when operating, and generally 
focused on the same function or product.  Thus, meeting the minimum requirements for 
this description should be a consideration as one of the goals of the fire support team at 
the company level. 
C. THE FIST AS A LATERAL RELATION MECHANISM 
The FiST must be examined as a tool used for lateral relations among the fire 
support stakeholders.  In Organizational Behavior: A Diagnostic Approach by Professor 
Judith R. Gordon (1999), the utility of groups to accomplish a mission is determined by 
the nature of that mission, specifically “(g)roup decision making leads to better results 
when a task or problem requires a variety of expertise and when problems have multiple 
parts that a division of labor can best address.” (Gordon 1999, 162)  The orchestration of 
the multiple fire support assets necessitate cooperation among individuals, as attempting 
to communicate and track each one at the same time would be overwhelming for one 
individual.  “Group decision making generally leads to higher quality solutions…using 
the group provides a way to solicit a range of ideas.” (Gordon 1999, 163)  The various 
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ways to solve the tactical level fire support issues can best be digested quickly and 
rationally by the professional team members who all bring a different perspective to the 
fight. 
The technical nature of each fire support asset and the limited ability of the 
infantry officer to be trained in the use of each asset necessitates the use of an integrating 
organization to effectively use those assets.  Taking into account the stakeholders’ views, 
the use of a FiST, or at least some conglomeration of representatives, is vital to fire 
support coordination and utilization at the tactical level. 
D. OPERATIONAL MEASURES TO MAKE TEAMS EFFECTIVE 
Galbraith’s guidance provides ten factors that contribute to the effectiveness of 
the lateral processes.  These are considerations for the analysis of the FiST, indications of 
where it fits on a scale of potential effectiveness, and tools to highlight negatives that 
exist.   
The first measure is the importance of the mission of the team and the task itself.  
“This will depend on how important they perceive it to be,…and whether their 
performance in the group will be evaluated or taken into account at their performance 
review.” (Galbraith 1977, 118)  The initial criterion is a result of the importance that 
superiors place on the team by staffing results.  The officials in charge of staffing the 
positions, for example, battery commanders in the artillery, can show how relevant the 
FiST concept is to them by how they fill the billets.  As the most junior, inexperienced 
officers are sent to fill the positions, both the Forward Observers (FOs) and the maneuver 
units receive an impression of the relative importance that the artillery community places 
on the role of the FiST.  Obviously the impression is negative.  In fact, the impression in 
the artillery community has developed in cases that if a first lieutenant is serving in an FO 
billet then he is likely to be judged incompetent by his peers.  Also, the performance of 
the individual in the team billet must be reflected in his evaluations.  Most often, 
maneuver company commanders do not write the FOs’ fitness reports and have little 
influence over the content of them.  The fitness reports reflect performance in collateral 
duties and general officership, not performance in the actual billet.  This communicates a 
message to the FOs that their performance with the maneuver community is not the 
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primary determinant of success.  At this point, only a strong sense of professionalism or, 
lacking that, heavy doses of negative reinforcement from the maneuver commander 
ensure competent performance. 
Second, the assignment of the team leader is a key aspect to the success of the 
team. (Galbraith 1977, 120)  An individual must be accountable for the decisions and 
actions of the team.  At the maneuver level, this is readily apparent as the FiST leader is 
often the executive officer (XO) who is the most experienced lieutenant in the company 
and the company commander is ultimately responsible for the results of the team.  What 
is missing is the cost of the FiST to the supporting agency.  If a way existed to reflect the 
performance of the teams on the providing units, better personnel would be a priority.  As 
it stands now, the maneuver unit’s only recourse is to replace artillery personnel with its 
own in hopes of better performance. 
Third, members of team are required to have information and assets that will 
augment the integration process.  This is important in order to keep the team from 
becoming an unwieldy mass of people.  Generally, the FiST finds itself in accordance 
with this principle but a suggestion mentioned from the maneuver community has 
relevance here.  If the extra bodies brought along with the FO team are superfluous to the 
accomplishment of the mission then changes should be made to streamline the group.  
Another issue is that, sometimes, enlisted observers are assigned to companies as the FO 
in the absence of available officers.  This can create a situation where either the 
individual does not have the ability to contribute to the team (which is actually rare) or 
cannot assert their exchange of information due to their level (rank) within the team (not 
so rare).  Again, the issue is one where inefficiencies can occur due to the constitution of 
the group. 
Fourth, “(p)articipants must have the authority to commit their department.” 
(Galbraith 1977, 121)  In a business sense, this means that a decision made by a 
representative has to be honored by the respective organization.  The failure of this 
affects the representative’s role and stature in the group.  Although this principle is well 
followed in the FiST sense, instances occur when a support asset cannot meet the 
requests of the team.  This creates an environment where the rest of the members can 
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start to lose confidence in that asset’s utility.  In various instances, this has occurred with 
each fire support asset and should be a consideration to the providing agency. 
Fifth, the basic differences in the hierarchical composition of the team can create 
friction. (Galbraith 1977, 122)  This occurs notably in business environments where 
decision-making authority is from a leader at a very high position on the hierarchical 
level while the technical expertise is provided from individuals at a lower level.  The 
situation is apparent though not as pronounced in the FiST based on terms of rank.  
Although the FiST leader is often a senior first lieutenant, the FO will be a lower ranking 
lieutenant, the Forward Air Controller (FAC ) a captain, and the mortars representative 
enlisted.  This can create a situation where the senior members have to rely on junior 
ones for advice and education or where a senior member tries to dominate when he is not 
the ultimate decision authority. 
Sixth, the processes of the inter-organizational unit must be congruent with those 
vertical information flows. (Galbraith 1977, 122) Because the FiST has remained fairly 
flexible in regards to its standard processes, the changing communication of information 
up and down the chain of command had been seamless.  The effects of technical 
requirements from the increasing digitization of fire support and communication has lead 
to a need for the FiST to enhance its abilities parallel to the higher units.  Consideration 
must be given to the competence of the artillery representatives in their vertical 
communications abilities relative to the organizations up the hierarchical ladder.  The 
upper echelons tend to have better equipment, more experience, and fewer distractions 
from training.  A mismatch in information flows can be created if the lower levels are not 
prioritized for training as much as the higher ones. 
Seventh, the obligation of time commitment from each representative is an 
important consideration. (Galbraith 1977, 123)  In other words, whether or not an 
individual is a full time member of the team is an indication of the tasks to be met.  The 
reality of the FiST is that rarely is the actual team intact over an extended period of time 
unless during protracted combat.  The FAC is permanently attached to the battalion, 
which lends itself to a convenient working relationship when the FiST is constituted.  The 
mortars representative is organic to the battalion also and, as a result, is responsive to the 
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teams needs.  As has previously been described, the FO is a genuine part time member 
and this one of the main issues that this project centers around.  One advantage of the part 
time situation is that the representative maintains a relationship with the supporting 
organization.  Another is the ability to separate outside of the group for reflection on 
problem solving outside of their influence and provide flexibility in manpower allotment.  
An effect of part time membership is that the identification and loyalty to the team is 
sacrificed.  An important consideration for the FiST is the detriment of being dislocated 
from the supporting unit is related to how quickly the technical changes occur. (Galbraith 
1977, 124)  In the case of the FO, these are not great over the course of a year. 
The eighth (conflict resolution practices), ninth (group and interpersonal skills), 
and tenth measurements (leadership) are all related in both a business and military sense.  
Although they are achieved in varying degrees through basic qualities brought to the mix 
by each individual, they are all aspects that can be augmented through increased practice 
and familiarity. Over the course of forming, storming, norming, and performing, these 
areas will often experience the full spectrum of conflict resolution methods and attitudes 
from the members. (Gordon 1999, 156)  The inherent leadership abilities possessed by 
the members and respect given to the decision-making authority, although not unique to 
the Marine Corps, is definitely a quality to be taken advantage of. 
The final literary analysis consists of various guidelines to be aware of when 
analyzing inter-organizational relationships.  It provides some tools for determining the 
effects of the cultural conditions existing between the organizations and shows what 
obstacles to coordination these may present.  It additionally addresses the situation 
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IV.  STAKEHOLDERS VIEWS ABOUT FIST 
The purpose of this section is to perform an analysis of stakeholders, which 
include artillery professionals, maneuver units, headquarters units, and Fire Support 
Team (FiST) members, and to evaluate stakeholder management according to the general 
explanation given in Harrison and St John’s Foundations in Strategic Management (2002)  
“The stakeholder analysis involves identifying and prioritizing key stakeholders, 
assessing their needs,” and applying this evaluation to the recommendations. (Harrison 
2002, 11)  Stakeholder management consists of interacting with the stakeholders to the 
benefit of the organization and, in this instance, the case for improvement.  Stakeholder 
interactions are most effective when conducted in a cooperative manner.  The plan and 
consideration of the stakeholders tries to emphasize the need for cooperation and selling 
the change ideas as beneficial for every party.   
 The organization for this chapter is to present each stakeholder’s position as 
generalized from interviews conducted in the informal, suggestive manner described 
before.  Some conflicting views within communities came to light and these are noted as 
necessary.  The benefits and negatives of the status quo as categorized by the groups will 
be presented. In addition, many suggestions for improvement were submitted and these 
are examined also. 
A. ARTILLERY 
1. Positives  
The present system allows the artillery batteries to keep all of their assets, 
including Forward Observers (FOs), scouts, and communicators, together in garrison and 
during battery specific training in the field.  This allows more hands for maintenance, 
driver’s, spread of collateral duties, and bodies for the never-ending list of taskers that 
come down from above.  In garrison, the liaison personnel are often used for duties in the 
armory, supply storage, and as extra motor transport operators.  Communications sections 
of batteries are often taxed with low numbers and experience of personnel.  Liaison 
officers often want the pick of the communicators for what is considered independent-
type duty.  The present system allows the battery to use these personnel in garrison.  The 
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extra personnel allow the battery flexibility for aggressor forces or auxiliary-type duties 
in the field for training. 
Additionally, the conventional wisdom of artillery commanders is that these 
lieutenants and enlisted Marines improve their artillery proficiencies and maintain 
identity with the artillery as a whole by remaining organic to the battery.  An extremely 
forceful argument comes from the senior officers that a young artillery officer’s place is 
learning the ins and outs of running a battery, to include fire direction, emplacement, 
security, convoy ops, and the dreaded maintenance.  This is a valid argument, as there are 
so many aspects of the battery operations to learn for preparation as a battery executive 
officer and commanding officer.  Only so much time exists (usually less than three years) 
for a lieutenant to spend in his first fleet tour and the conventional wisdom is that he 
doesn’t have time to play “grunt” (in other words, with maneuver outside of the battery).  
There is also the fear that the young officers and Marines who “live” with the maneuver 
elements will begin to identify more with them and lose allegiance to the artillery 
background.   
Battery commanders benefit from the flexibility of detaching officers in FO 
billets, depending on their ability and usefulness to the battery.  In a battery of strong, 
competent enlisted leadership, the commander may be able to let his best lieutenants go 
to fill the fire support billets.  If he finds himself in a less than optimal situation, he may 
retain more officers as needed. 
The present system is congruent with the present career progression path for 
officers.  It allows some time for experience as a fire supporter (FO or liaison officer), 
time in the battery as a fire direction officer, guns platoon commander, executive officer, 
and maybe time in the battalion as a junior staff officer.  This can all be accomplished 
within three years, usually less, and allows the officer to leave for a secondary (B) billet 
in time to return to a battery as a Captain and battery commander.  The present structure 
supports the present manpower and personnel organizations in their desire to fill billets 




2. Negatives  
One of the main concerns expressed by the artillerymen was that fire support 
technology has progressed too fast for the present system.  This is primarily a training 
issue from Marines who have served in the FO and liaison sections.  The new Advanced 
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is very technically intense and requires 
constant training to maintain competency.  The present system does not support this 
amount of training as enlisted fire support personnel are pulled away for extra duties 
within the battery.  In addition, very junior enlisted and officer artillery fire supporters 
tend to be proficient at spotting and adjusting fires but inadequate in coordination of the 
fire support elements.  This often stems from little prioritization in the battery garrison 
and field environments.  This is intensified by often having the junior officers and no 
staff noncommissioned officer in the section leading to an inability to assert the need for 
liaison specific training when the rest of the battery is focused on parades, motor stables, 
and supply inventories.   
Another prevalent concern, especially from junior officers, is that often fire 
support personnel are torn between duties in the battery and in the maneuver unit.  
Various cases were described where, generally, a detached lieutenant was expected to 
conduct his collateral duties in the battery while serving with the maneuver.  Obviously, 
this is a disconnect between the intent of detachment and its practice, but the reality is an 
indication of the reluctance to truly give up those fire support personnel. 
The artillery community, or at least part of it, realizes itself that providing the 
most inexperienced lieutenants to be FOs is detrimental to the maneuver units and 
ultimately to the artillery itself.  “As FOs, in their role as advisors to the company 
commander on fire support, they are often ineffective due to a lack of inexperience and 
knowledge of the gunline.” (Hallet 2002, 32)  The lack of experience for FOs and 
specifically its consequences can be tragic:  
In retrospect, it hardly seems possible that we, as a Nation, would allow 
such a restrictive peacetime policy to flourish while Marines were dying 
by the thousands in a shooting war.  But we did-and we got what we paid 
for!  Marines shudder when they think of fellow Marines killed by 
“friendly fire.”  How many names are on the black granite wall in 
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Washington, DC, because an FO called in the wrong grid, or a brand new 
fire direction officer didn’t check the quadrant site sent to the firing 
battery.  More than we care to speculate.  Marines were winding down 
their direct participation in 1970-1971, but through all those years, we 
would not-or did not- change our flawed personnel policy.  (Glasgow 
2003, 55) 
The structure that they speak of is the same as it is now.  With rapid billet changes 
and inexperience in the wrong places, the artillery has lost some of the confidence of the 
maneuver side.  This is exemplified by the adoption of an infantry officer as the battalion 
fire support coordinator as opposed to an artillery officer, who by training and experience 
should best fit the position. 
3. Suggestions for improvement  
Such a variety of possible improvements were proposed that it is impossible to 
include them all.  However, some distinct categories can be found.  Many respondents’ 
feedback indicated that the present system is the best available to balance all of the 
requirements of the two main stakeholders, artillery and maneuver.  There are various 
adjustments that make considerable sense.   
One suggestion, best explained by Lieutenant Colonel Eric G. Hansen in the 
Marine Gazette (2003), is to actually separate the fire support element from the cannon 
artillery branch altogether.  Citing the wide diversity of command and control, fire 
support, and joint coordination assets that the fire support coordinators, FiST leaders, and 
FOs have to master to be proficient, he states that the pasted together system and part 
time attention that it gets from both the infantry and artillery merits a completely new 
military occupational specialty (MOS).  LtCol. Hansen also offers the loss of habitual 
relationships, the pending introduction of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS) and the Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS), and the digitization of 
fire support as evidence of the growing need for an MOS focused on fire support outside 
of the artillery battery and battalion.  The digitization and new weapon systems both 
require increased training and proficiency on both sides of the fire support process.  He 
and some other artillerymen believe that the best way to support the maneuver side is to 
focus specialties on the fire direction and fire support coordination side.  Put simply, the 
plan would create an organization, the fire support regiment (with customary subordinate 
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battalions, companies, and platoons), which would detach members to serve as fire 
support coordination personnel in the maneuver units.  These personnel would be trained 
to use and integrate all the fire support assets available at their unit’s level. (Hansen 2003, 
21-24)  
A change that has been adopted by some artillery battalions in the Marine Corps 
has been to consolidate the liaison personnel at the battalion level.  This has, to some 
degrees of effectiveness, taken control out of battery commanders’ hands and allowed the 
fire support personnel to focus on their specific training.  It has also allowed some 
sections to improve their habitual relationship with their respective maneuver units.   
Some opinions were that the enlisted portion of the liaison sections and FO teams 
should be permanently attached to the maneuver battalions according to the habitual 
relationships.  This would allow for continuity within the FiST and create a permanent 
representation from the artillery community.  It would create a sense of responsibility to 
the maneuver units and provide a vehicle to quickly educate young, inexperienced 
lieutenants, who are usually the individuals manning the liaison and FO billets. 
A variation of this would be to replace the liaison officer and FO billets with 
warrant officers.  It would create the best case for continuity among the FiST and would 
create a professional fire support focused entity.  The officers allotted on the table of 
organization (T/O) for a battery would be reduced because of the permanent change of 
who owns the liaison personnel and the maneuver units would now permanently own 
both the enlisted and officer billets in garrison and the field. 
It should not be discounted that some interviews indicated that the present system 
best satisfies all of the requirements of the stakeholders and works most efficiently from 
their perspective.  The reasons for their position are described above in the “positives” 
section.  This preservation is a valid option and has to be weighed against the other 
suggestions.  However, one single theme came from each of the respondents who favored 





On the other hand, many maneuver representatives feel as if they are not being 
fully supported by the artillery.  A clear indication of this is the habit of appointing 
infantry officers to fire support coordinator billets and carrying out most fire support 
duties within the company amongst the executive officer and the forward air controller.   
1. Positives   
Responses from those interviewed who had experience in either Desert Storm or 
Operation Iraqi Freedom indicated that they were impressed with the responsiveness and 
effectiveness of the artillery’s fire support when it was needed.  Many were surprised that 
it worked well in an urban environment and did not have as much trouble keeping up 
with the maneuver forces as had been feared.   
Some individuals involved with FiST confidently noted that their experience of 
having conducted a Combined Arms Exercise (CAX) at 29 Palms, California with the 
same team that they later operated in combat in was an integral key to their success.  The 
FiST offered advantages in providing the rifle company with links to powerful assets.  
Not only were the FACs vital for coordinating Close Air Support (CAS), they were also 
useful for casualty evacuations by air and for helping to communicate with air 
reconnaissance efforts.  The ability of these individuals to speak the aviator’s language 
and communicate seamlessly was important.  Additionally, more than one actual FiST 
leader indicated that an experienced or at least competent FO is the most important asset 
that the FiST leader has at his disposal.  They stated that the training and comprehension 
of combined arms gives the FOs an advantage in perceiving the mental model of the 
assets being coordinated. 
Another benefit is that the compliment of communicators and enlisted scout 
observers provides the company with enhanced communication ability.  In any 
operational environment, communications is often the hardest tool to maintain.  Some 
responses, especially from the senior enlisted ones within the rifle companies, 
appreciated the ability of the communicators brought by the FO team to assist in 
maintaining the company’s overall communication network.  Because the 
communicators, scout observers, and FOs are all cross-trained to at least a minimal 
 36
degree of competency in each other’s job, they are all able to manage the radios that are 
present in the units they are attached to. 
Additionally, the artillery FOs and especially the scouts are useful in planning for 
and using mortar fires.  In one case, the FiST leader was confident enough in his artillery 
personnel, that he returned the mortars representative to the mortar section to help them 
with their own operations.  It was never stated that the artillerymen were better observers 
than the mortar men but that they had a better sense of planning the fires and could 
anticipate the coordination with other assets well. 
Finally, many interviews conveyed that artillery was generally more responsive 
than close air support.  It is not clear why this was so but it gives an indication that the 
artillery gained a certain increased reliance relative to air during the combat operations.  
This does not diminish the importance of CAS.  It does portray the importance of artillery 
as a vital fire support assets and the need to be able to use it effectively. 
2. Negatives  
One pervasive theme, especially among the combat experienced interviews, was 
that in situations where the FO team was attached to the company just prior to 
deployment, the lack of continuity severely inhibited the development of the FiST’s 
abilities.  As described before, one reason is because of the artillery’s reluctance to keep 
the FO teams with the companies on a permanent basis.  Maneuver units understand the 
need to develop well-oiled teams and for these teams to remain together as long as 
possible.  Even when teams must gain and lose new members, the continuity of an 
understood standard operating procedure occurs when the replacements are exchanged 
out of the same units.  Some units received FOs from units who were not within their 
habitual relationship.  Commanders feel that they need to know the strengths and 
weaknesses of these individuals, including everyone in the FiST, prior to deployment and 
operations.  The present system rarely offers the team a chance to become cohesive under 
the status quo.   
Another concern dealing with continuity is that the officers that are attached as 
FOs are so inexperienced that they are unable to answer artillery specific questions 
because of a lack of experience in the battery.  Young second lieutenants, just out of 
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artillery school at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, are trained well to be observers but have less 
developed of a concept of how to determine why a battery might not be shooting as 
responsively as desired, how to effectively communicate to a fire direction officer exactly 
what is desired, or what the actual movement operations of a battery is like for his 
planning purposes.  Company commanders and FiST leaders are better served by an 
individual who can answer the questions that may be asked about the “stuff going on 
back there” in the artillery world.   
The maneuver personnel also indicated that the habitual relationships as they are 
now are mainly just formally declared and do not work for the purpose that they were 
intended.  Many believe that it would work best if the relationships were practiced, not 
just designated, all the way down to the artillery battery supporting the infantry battalion 
level.  Tank and light armored reconnaissance (LAR) Marines also stated that they 
believed that many problems that occur in the fire support area stems from a lack of 
stable relationships and even accountability of the artillery batteries to the maneuver 
units. 
One negative that is potentially crippling is the unique situation that FOs find 
themselves when attached to tank units.  There is no room for communicators or scouts in 
the tanks so the FO fills all of his duties.  This is not usually an issue as he is trained to 
operate radios and the other team gear.  However, he must be able to perform as the 
tank’s loader and as a member of the tank’s crew.  In order to qualify to do this, the FO 
needs sufficient time to train with the company and assimilate into the operations as a 
tanker.  The haphazard attachment process tends to jeopardize the teamwork necessary 
for the functioning of the tank. 
3. Suggestions for Improvement 
The offering for improvement from the maneuver Marines was generally in line 
with the artillery community.  One of the main themes was to permanently attach the 
Liaison and FO teams to the maneuver units.  This would necessitate a change in the 
Table of Organization and create billets within the maneuver companies and battalions 
for artillery personnel.  This measure would create the continuity that is lacking and 
allow commanders to mold their personnel in the fashion that best suits their methods. 
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In addition, a suggestion by the maneuver respondents is particularly relevant.  
They suggest that permanent assignment of artillery officers and scout observers would 
create an opportunity to have every member of the infantry battalion trained in 
rudimentary fire support as well as take some of that considerable burden off of the 
platoon commanders in that regard.  Not only would every Marine be a rifleman but he 
would also be a fire supporter also.  This type of training would increase the confidence 
and camaraderie in the artillery community from the basic rifleman on up through the 
non-commissioned officers as they had a better understanding of what fire support 
actually meant and how it could be used. 
Another suggestion, coming exclusively from tank and LAR Marines, is that the 
FiST should be streamlined.  The plethora of communicators and scouts that accompany 
an FO team are unnecessary in this view.  This idea stems from the efficiency that comes 
from the necessity of tank FOs to operate and maintain their own radios.  Often in 
infantry units, a lieutenant will rely on his communicator to relay his messages regarding 
artillery fire support and it can create confusion and miscommunication.  This idea seems 
in direct contradiction to the infantry position that more is better and appreciation for the 
extra communicators and scouts is beneficial.   The essence is actually that the primary 
team members should be involved in the fire support process and the communicators are 
present to maintain the gear only. 
The prospect that a separate fire support specific specialty be developed was 
thought to be less than positive.  Without getting much elaboration, the maneuver side 
felt that this would lead to unnecessary overhead and would not meet the requirements of 
creating an artillery specific reference expert for the commander.  In other words, these 
specialists would have no more idea of what was going on in the battery or artillery 
battalion than the infantry or armor Marines. 
C. FORWARD AIR CONTROLLERS 
A prime example of permanent attachments working well is the program designed 
for the FAC’s.  Pilots undergo training to be able to serve as forward air controllers and 
then are permanently attached to a maneuver battalion for at least a year.  This 
relationship allows the same pilots to be allotted to companies and work with their FiST 
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for an extended period.  The maneuver units value these officers not only for their 
expertise but also for the diverse perspectives they bring from their background.   
1. Positives  
FACs felt that the present system worked well where they were able to develop 
strong working relationships with the FiST that they might work with.  The FACs are 
given an opportunity to focus on the primary reason for Marine aviation’s existence, the 
support of the rifleman. 
Being this close to the ground combat element everyday gives the pilots a sense of 
responsibility and enhances the understanding of the situation on the ground.  This is a 
positive during later flying tours.  Also, the FACs have a unique ability to understand 
what the pilot sees from his or her aircraft and can better communicate with the 
supporting air elements.  This aspect is extremely important to the pilot in the air.  He or 
she wants to be able to support the maneuver units without endangering them.  It is 
difficult for an infantryman, tanker, or artilleryman to understand what descriptions are 
pertinent to a pilot who may be moving at 400 or more miles per hour.  This aspect is 
very similar to the impressions that an FO needs to give to a fire direction officer (FDO) 
in order to fully explain what he needs in regards to artillery fire support. 
2. Negatives  
FACs felt that the irregular turnover of FiST personnel, specifically FOs, was a 
considerable drawback.  The FAC and FO need to have a smooth working relationship in 
order to deconflict the firing of artillery rounds and the flight of aircraft.  A small amount 
of mathematical calculations are required as well as a developed understanding of terms 
and individual tendencies.  This type of relationship is only developed in a CAX or 
similar type combined arms training, or it is done in combat. 
FACs also want to be able to train the FO teams, specifically the enlisted side, 
how to talk to and coordinate air.  The benefits from this allow the scout observers, in 
combat situations, to observe the best targets for CAS and even coordinate the aircraft if 
necessary.  The training that allows this type of proficiency is not available under the 
present system.  FACs needs prolonged periods of garrison training to ensure that non-
pilots are proficient enough to not only call in air but to coordinate it also. 
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3. Suggestions for Improvement 
The main idea among the suggestions from pilots was to permanently attach the 
enlisted side of the liaison and FO team to the maneuver units.  In addition, they propose 
to create one-year tours with the artillery officers much like the pilots serve themselves.  
This proposal allows for continuity and more time to develop fire support proficiencies.  
The cross training that would occur would allow the FiST to operate fully even when 
missing a member due to manpower shortage or casualty.  In addition, the artillery 
officers would return later to their batteries and battalions with a strong affinity for the 
maneuver community and a sense of obligation to provide the best fire support possible. 
D. ANALYSIS 
The stakeholders’ comments and suggestions give the impression of a functional 
system that has frequent periods of instability and inefficiency. The critical issue to the 
performance of the fire support system is the disconnection of interaction between the 
maneuver and artillery communities.  The inability to provide optimal coordination 
specifically stems from an organizational deficiency.  The deficiency can best be 
analyzed through the use of organizational culture literature and, more specifically, 
service provider/customer guidelines. 
Two main types of organizational culture occur among the organizations involved 
in the fire support system.  The first is the mission culture, which is the ideal one for the 
artillery, maneuver, and the FiST.  “The mission culture is characterized by emphasis on 
one clear vision of the organization’s purpose and on the achievement of goals…” (Daft 
2001, 121)  As described in Chapter One, each organization within the division has a 
specific mission.  The combat and organizational doctrine is focused around identifying 
and accomplishing missions for the various organizations so that they may win America’s 
battles.  The vision for accomplishing this is to ultimately support the Marine rifleman on 
the ground.   
The other culture that occurs is the bureaucratic one.  The word bureaucratic is 
considered very negative in the combat arms of the Marine Corps and it is negative in this 
context.  The definition of bureaucratic culture is having “an internal focus and a 
consistency orientation for a stable environment.”  (Daft 2001, 122)  This definition 
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applies directly to the artillery community.  The statements from interviewees regarding 
career progression, intra-battery operations, and the convenience of asset hoarding are 
good, albeit negative, examples of a bureaucratic culture.  The desire to maintain a stable, 
convenient operating environment results in an inward looking and change resistant 
stance.  This sort of culture is an accurate description of the artillery community as a 
whole.  The condition leads the community to lose sight of its mission oriented culture, 
whose focus is supporting the maneuver side of the division, and myopically look inward 
to ensure stability and internal priorities.   
The term for what has occurred in the gradual transformation from a mission 
culture to a bureaucratic one is goal displacement.  The artillery community has begun to 
place higher priority in ensuring career progression and internal stability than maintaining 
good relations with its maneuver brethren.  Another description for this occurrence is 
“suboptimization of organizational goals.”  (Ashkensas 1995, 119)  This is defined as a 
warning sign for incongruent lateral relationships where “functional specialists begin to 
view their localized goals ahead of the organization’s goals in order to optimize their 
achievements and rewards.”  (Ashkensas 1995, 119)  The literature provides a 
background to interpret the condition of the organization and how the mission and 
purpose of the organization can become skewed.  Additionally, the “(c)ore purpose, the 
second component of core ideology, is the organization’s reason for being.”  (Collins & 
Porras 1994, 224)  This purpose is the focus that the artillery must not lose sight of.  The 
whole of Marine Corps artillery exists only to ultimately support the rifleman.  In the 
day-to-day processes of work, it is easy to lose sight of this purpose.  
One way to overcome the goal displacement phenomenon is to abandon the 
myopia of the groupthink within the organization and focus on the processes that ensure 
accomplishment of the true goal.  (Ashkensas 1995, 175)  The arguments and concerns 
voiced in opposition to change usually focus on the bureaucratic concerns.  If the focus 
can be placed on the basic processes for providing optimal fire support and building the 
organizational culture, or in the artillery community, reawakening the organizational 
culture to focus on its purpose, then the distracting protests to change and progress may 
be quieted. 
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The first step to achieve the change is to reconfigure the boundaries that exist 
between the artillery and maneuver organizations.  The traditional stovepipe structure that 
the Marine Corps operates with is essential to the principles of chain of command and 
unified command.  The horizontal boundaries are essential to the organizations identity 
and purpose.  (Ashkensas 1995, 112-113)  One symptom of the boundaries is “protected 
turf.” 
Once horizontal boundaries become ensconced, people vie to protect their 
department’s power and resources.  Any change in process is viewed as 
antagonistic to the status quo rather than useful to the organization, and 
departments end up spending more time protecting turf than securing or 
satisfying customers. (Ashkensas 1995, 117) 
This symptom is prevalent in numerous organizations and pervades throughout 
the interservice rivalries in the Department of Defense.  The consequence of turf battles is 
loss of mission focus and inefficiency.  The trick, however, is to make the boundaries as 
permeable as possible.  (Ashkensas 1995, 256)  The recommendation from one scholar is 
to “bust the boundaries.”  (Ashkensas 1995, 337)  This is not as drastic as it sounds.  It 
entails integrating the participants in a given interaction situation and institutionalizing 
the action.  The FiST and other fire support linkages up the organizational structure are 
already present to do this.  The condition is that the artillery has periodically withdrawn 
from this linkage and this contributes to boundaries. 
The main tenet of this section boils down to a very business specific concept that 
applies in a great way to the artillery’s role in the fire support system.  Customer service 
is a concept that harnesses the focus of complete professional areas of study.  It has 
applicability as a simile with the maneuver as the customer and the artillery, among other 
departments, as service provider.  “The boundaryless organization begins and ends with 
the customers, however defined.  Its entire focus is to anticipate and serve changing 
customer needs.  Moreover, it works to see itself from the customer’s point of view.  The 
boundaryless horizontal organization is effective when all employees understand and feel 
the needs of the customer and all internal processes aim to form and strengthen external 
relationships.” (Ashkensas 1995, 128)  A symptom of lacking customer focus is when the 
customer begins to form its own integration vehicles.  This is very evident in the staffing 
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of fire support coordinators at the battalion level with maneuver officers.  Additionally, 
the FiST is a maneuver/customer response to integrate all of its fire support assets.  The 
forward air controllers, forward observers, and mortar observers are the service providers 
and should be the lead forces for integration.  One goal of this project is to gain an idea of 
exactly what the customer (maneuver) values as the measurements to determine success.  
In other words,  
Ask them how they measure and assess your effectiveness and what it 
would take to delight them.  Then look at your organization and test 
whether you are measuring indicators that align with your customers’ 
expectations. (Ashkensas 1995, 148) 
The maneuver organizations are satisfied with the responsiveness and 
effectiveness of artillery fires in combat.  They are pleased that the artillery can be 
counted on for support in all weather.  One aspect that the maneuver side is not pleased 
with is its perceived priority in manning and coordination training at the lowest levels.   
The FiST and the FO team in particular is the fundamental tool for achieving this 
ideal.  The FO is, in business parlance, a consultant to the company commander on the 
best application of his unique product, artillery fires.  Consulting and selling for a product 
is closely related and many companies move toward their sales people serving both roles.  
(Ashkensas 1995, 203)  The concept creates a way for the FO to “provide products, 
services, and solutions in a variety of ways so as to match the unique needs of the 
customer” and “help the customer use the products in creative or high leverage ways.”  
(Ashkensas 1995, 241)  This creates a pull-type demand and dependence for the service 
that increases the importance of the consultant.   
The overarching vision is that the artillery will begin to see itself as a provider of 
support for the maneuver or, in business terms, grasp the importance of serving the 
customer.   The specific goal is to improve the effectiveness of the FiST and provide 
better fire support from the junior level artillery officers.  When the supplier fails to 
properly serve the customer, the customer will find alternatives.  This is the case of the 
infantry substituting their own personnel in place of artillerymen in fire support 
coordinator billets and most recently, requesting to develop the expeditionary fire support 
system as a solution to Marine artillery’s infatuation with the 155mm howitzer system 
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and its inherent non-deployability due to large size.  Articles in the Marine Corps Gazette 
go into further detail.   
(S)addled with just the M198 155mm howitzer, the MEU’s artillery 
batteries almost never go ashore as artillerymen...The MEU’s have been 
reluctant to bring artillery with them at all, accepting the risks of battle 
without artillery just because of the difficulty of getting the artillery and its 
ammunition and its prime movers to the fight. (Lindsey 2003, 15-16).   
This is where the project effort focuses its main effort. The purpose should inspire 
change and make the artillery welcome to ideas to improve fire support.  The purpose of 
providing the best fire support possible is the guiding point.  Thus, the envisioned future 
is a community where artillery officers in their formative years as lieutenants have lived 
with their maneuver brethren long enough that they feel bonded to them.  They 
understand the need for effective artillery support and how to best work in order to 
achieve that.  They are not hampered or distracted by secondary priorities because 




























V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The project analyzes the organizations, their link (the FiST), the stakeholders’ 
perceptions, and the academic models in order to evaluate the utility of the FiST and how 
it may be improved.  The conclusion of this project is that the FiST concept works in the 
Marine Corps division.  It meets the guidelines of the research to provide an effective 
linking mechanism between the interacting organizations.  The FiST allows decision 
making to be pushed down to the lowest level possible.  Not only does this take a burden 
off of the higher echelons, it also creates the ability for decisions to be made where the 
requisite information is the freshest, most relevant, and real to the user.  The FiST has 
given the maneuver company unprecedented access to firepower at the company level 
and also the means to combine that firepower into a no-win proposition for the enemy.  
The differences in rank among the members rarely seems to be an issue as the team 
begins to focus more on mission accomplishment.  A most telling aspect of the analysis is 
that all of the stakeholders are very satisfied with the general FiST concept.  The opinion 
of such a diversity of professional seems to converge that the FiST works.  The opinion is 
overwhelming that it can be improved. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
First, the Marine Corps needs to create doctrine that will formally legitimize the 
FiST in writing.  This formalization will serve to remind the artillery community of the 
importance of the fire support coordination side of the fire support equation.   
The next step will be to formally place the FO team under the full time control of 
the maneuver units.  The complete liaison section will be contained within the infantry, 
tank, or LAR battalion.  The enlisted members of liaison section and FO teams will stay 
in those units throughout their tour.  The officers would spend their first two years of 
fleet service in the battery.  The last year would be spent in a liaison section of a 
maneuver battalion, filling FO billets initially and then the liaison officer billet as the 
seniority allows.  The Artillery Operational Advisory Group (OAG) has already 
recommended that lieutenant’s initial fleet tours be three years as opposed to the 30 
months that they are now.  (Burkepile 2000, 48)  This would ensure that senior, 
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experienced officers fill the billets for the company commanders where experience and 
effective counsel are so important.  This measure would communicate to all involved that 
fire support is, in fact, a priority among the artillery community.  The battery and 
battalion commanders would be forced to provide individuals for these billets and learn 
to demand more of their firing battery officers, instead of relying on and hoarding the few 
effectives in each battery. The maneuver communities would understand that their need 
for effective fire support is indeed the focus of the artillery.  This would also create a 
situation where the artillery officers would be reported on by their infantry brethren, thus 
making them more beholden to quality support and reinforcing the importance of their 
role.  The ability of the FO to assert himself to the battery and battalion fire direction 
centers (FDCs) would be enhanced due to the inherent experience of the observer.  This 
would create a confidence in the firing unit side that the individual on the other end 
knows exactly what he is asking for.  Another consideration is that the increased rank 
(from second to first lieutenant) and experience of the FO would allow him to stand on 
more equal footing with the other members of the team.   
This measure of change would have both immediate effects, as described above, 
and more importantly, long term ones in regards to culture and development of the fire 
support system.  The maneuver units would benefit immensely from everyday contact 
with both the enlisted and officer artillerymen.  The extensive training that could be 
administered to even the most junior infantrymen and tankers would pay dividends in the 
future as their tactical understanding and abilities were multiplied.  The feeling that the 
artillery representatives were there to support them would create an interest that only a 
customer can have in his products.  In other words, fire support would be improved if 
only because of an increase in interest. 
Every artillery officer would become a member of a maneuver community in at 
least one point in time.  Not only would the officer have close ties to the artillery 
community he just left, he would be a catalyst for interaction between the two 
organizations that would strengthen the habitual relationships much more than they are 
now.  This change at the fundamental level of fire support would help to change the 
culture of the organizations.  Specifically, the artillery, as the “imbedded” officers 
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returned to battery and battalion command, would understand the importance of effective 
support from a very fundamental experience.  Rhetoric can only take one so far; it will be 
the interaction that truly ingrains the vision of supporting the rifleman into the artillery.  
The experience during the formative years in officer development will improve the 
effectiveness of the fire support coordination centers up the organizational structure.  
Familiarity and trust will bring the fire support coordination billets back into the purview 
of the artillery MOS.  Ultimately, the inward looking, provincial culture of the artillery 
community will, by evolution, change towards an attitude of considering the maneuver 
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